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Quine once remarked that the term “philosophy” (and, so, the discipline of philosophy) 
was, as he put it, something like “Middle Atlantic” or “Northwest Central” rather than 
like “Texas.” His point was that philosophy covered a broad range of concerns and, so, 
was more akin to a conceptual geographical region than to a precisely defined or 
articulated space. 
 
The same can be said of pragmatism. There are certainly features that are shared by 
many of those who are called “pragmatists” (either self-identified as such or labeled by 
others as such). For example, Richard Bernstein identified five aspects of the 
“pragmatist ethos”: antifoundationalism, fallibilism, sociality of self and community, 
awareness and sensitivity to contingency, and embracing of pluralism. Nevertheless, 
these aspects are not taken to be a set of defining criteria and certainly not necessary or 
sufficient for whatever goes by the label “pragmatism.” Different folks who go by the 
label “pragmatist” (again, either by choice or by accusation) might or might not ascribe 
to, allow, embrace, accept, or be committed to some or other of these aspects. As with 
any “ism,” there is similarity and continuity with respect to very broad notions, but 
there is also wide variability and even disagreement among the practitioners of that ism.  
 
In the case of pragmatism, this diversity in the context of commonality has been true 
from the get-go. It is by now a common folktale about Peirce's famous - or perhaps 
infamous - annoyance with William James, which eventually led him to abandon the  
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term ‘pragmatism’ in favor of ‘pragmaticism’, which he remarked was “ugly enough to 
be safe from kidnappers.” And, as Joseph Margolis pointed out decades ago, Peirce, 
James, and Dewey (classical pragmatism’s “Big Three”) were different enough, even at 
times antithetical enough, from each other that it is a stretch to call them all 
pragmatists. More recently, Rorty and Putnam, while both happily bore the badge of 
“pragmatism,” engaged in slings and arrows against much of each other’s work.  
 
Be that as it may, there is a region of thought (if not a state of mind) that typically gets 
identified as pragmatist, as the present book gives testimony to. Over the years there 
have been a number of anthologies of pragmatist philosophical writing: Gail Kennedy’s 
The American Pragmatists (1960), Amelie Rorty’s Pragmatic Philosophy (1966), H.S. 
Thayer’s Pragmatism: The Classic Writings (1982), Louis Menand’s Pragmatism: A 
Reader (1997), John Stuhr’s Pragmatism and Classical American Philosophy (2000). 
More recently, there was Susan Haack’s Pragmatism, Old and New (2006). What was 
different about this collection was that Haack included a number of pieces from 
contemporary pragmatists, such as Quine, Goodman, Putnam, and Rorty. However, of 
the thirty-three readings collected in her anthology, twenty-one of them were by the Big 
Three (nine by Peirce, five by James, and seven by Dewey). 
 
Talisse and Aikin’s compilation, on the other hand, contains thirty-one pieces, 
representing eighteen different philosophers. Of those thirty-one pieces, only nine are 
by the Big Three. This is (for this reviewer, at least) a welcomed shift in emphasis. Nor 
is this editorial decision merely an attempt not to duplicate anthologies such at those 
noted above. Rather, there is a driving conviction on their part that pragmatism has 
been alive and well – indeed, mainstream – throughout the past century of philosophy. 
This conviction is spelled out clearly in their spirited introduction to this volume, 
particularly in what they call the “eclipse narrative” of the history of pragmatism. 
 
It has been claimed that recently there has been a renaissance of pragmatism in the 
philosophical community. Not only have a multitude of books and articles on 
pragmatism been published in the past several decades, but notable thinkers across 
philosophical traditions have embraced or at least endorsed aspects of it, thinkers 
ranging from Quine, Putnam and Rorty to Habermas, Eco and Apel. There is one sense 
in which this claim of renaissance is true, namely, more philosophers today opening 
identify themselves as pragmatist or explicitly draw on others who as identified as such 
or at least do not shun the label. However, as Talisse and Aikin note, talk of a 
renaissance is misleading in the sense that pragmatism has been with us continuously 
since Peirce. For just a few examples, Russell and Dewey engaged in rousing debates 
on epistemology, logic and truth throughout the first third of the 20th century; Quine 
championed pragmatism via his brand of naturalism throughout his career; Habermas 
has advocated tenets of pragmatism in some form or other since the 1960s.  
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What Talisse and Aikin call the eclipse narrative is that, while pragmatism (via the Big 
Three) was taken seriously during the early 20th century, it became eclipsed by other 
schools of thought (such as Logical Positivism or Existentialism) and philosophical 
stances or methods (such as linguistic analysis or deconstruction). This narrative, they 
argue, is false. As just mentioned above, pragmatism did not fade into the shadows after 
the 1920s only to be resurrected in the 1980s, following Rorty’s Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature. Instead, it has been mainstream philosophy during this entire time. 
Among the, not simply mainstream but highly influential, philosophers of the past 
century who are appropriately deemed pragmatist – and who are represented in this 
volume – are: Goodman, Quine, Carnap, Sellars, Davidson, Putnam, and others. To 
suggest that pragmatism has been sidelined, then, is misleading at best. 
 
Another point made by the editors of this volume is that pragmatism should not be seen 
as primarily focused on metaphilosophy, dealing with stances or approaches or methods 
of how to do philosophy. No, they have been – and need to be even more so – engaged 
in first-order philosophical issues: philosophy of language, philosophy of science, 
philosophy of mind, etc. Quine didn’t talk only about how to go about thinking about 
logic or ontology, but what the best view of logic and ontology are; Sellars didn’t talk 
only about how to go about thinking about mind, but what the best view of mind is; 
Putnam hasn’t been talking only about how to go about thinking of reference, but what 
the best view of reference is. This volume, then, makes the case, via its contents of 
serious and (in some cases) historically highly influential pieces, that pragmatism is and 
has been center-stage in philosophy for quite some time, thank you! In addition, it has 
important and fruitful things to say about solving, and not merely dismissing, 
philosophical problems. 
 
As mentioned above, the volume contains thirty-one pieces, representing eighteen 
philosophers. It is basically chronological, beginning with the Big Three, and including 
the somewhat “obligatory” articles from them, e.g., Peirce’s “Fixation of Belief” and 
“How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” James’s “Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth” and 
“The Will to Believe,” and Dewey’s “The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy” and 
“Creative Democracy – The Task before Us.” These are followed by articles by: Sidney 
Hook, C.I. Lewis, Nelson Goodman, W.V.O. Quine, Rudolf Carnap, Wilfrid Sellars, 
Donald Davidson, Hilary Putman, Richard Rorty, Cornell West, Susan Haack, Richard 
A. Posner, Robert Brandom, Huw Price, and Cheryl Misak. (Goodman, Quine, Putnam, 
and Rorty all rate multiple articles, while the others are represented by one apiece.) 
These include some obvious classic works, such as Lewis’s “A Pragmatic Conception 
of the A Priori,” Carnap’s “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology,” Davidson’s “On 
The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” and Putnam’s “Meaning and Reference.” It 
also includes some not classic works (at least not classic to many readers), such as 
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Haack’s “Double Aspect Foundherentism: A New Theory of Empirical Justification,” 
Price’s “Truth as a Convenient Friction,” and Misak’s “Making Disagreement Matter: 
Pragmatism and Deliberative Democracy.” Happily (at least to this reviewer), the Big 
Three constitute only about one third of the book’s content, as the editors demonstrate 
the historical and on-going substantive contributions to first-order philosophy via the 
emphasis on post-Big Three thinkers. 
 
It seems that unless a reviewer (or, a conference commentator) complains about 
something, no matter how much they agree with the subject under review, that person is 
not seen as doing a proper job. So, although I agree with Talisse and Aikin, I will offer 
two carps. The first is that I wish they had included some “non-analytic” voices in this 
collection. Three were mentioned above (Habermas, Eco, Apel), but there are many 
others. Pragmatism has been engaged in first-order philosophy on the other side of the 
pond for a long time and it would be good to have that incorporated more in what 
American philosophers say and do. 
 
My second carp is that, although I agree that the eclipse narrative is at least misleading, 
if not flat-out false, there is good reason for that narrative have been promoted. It is still 
the case that a great many philosophers, at least in this country, have read little or no 
works by classical pragmatist philosophers. While most philosophers of language could 
enunciate the subtle distinctions between the causal theory of reference and the theory 
of direct reference, very few of them are even aware that Peirce or Dewey had anything 
whatsoever to say about reference. It is still that case that for many self-labeled 
“analytic” philosophers pragmatism today = Richard Rorty (and they are quick to 
dismiss both). It is still few and far between that philosophy graduate programs in this 
country actively promote (or, for some, take seriously) pragmatism as first-order 
philosophy. So, while Talisse and Aikin are quite right, I think, that pragmatism was 
never really marginalized there are grounds for why some have said that it was. 
 
That being said, this is an excellent collection, not simply of pragmatist thinkers, but 
serious and substantive philosophers. Talisse and Aikin have done a truly fine job of 
exhibiting the contributions to first-order philosophy by pragmatist-oriented thinkers 
over the years and helping to dispel the notion that pragmatism has been on the 
sidelines of important philosophical work. I recommend it, not only as an introduction 
to pragmatism (indeed, more than an introduction), but also as a work of fecund 
philosophical engagement. 
 
 
 
